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Freedom of thought at the ethical frontier of law & science
Marcus Moore
Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia
ABSTRACT
Some of the most compelling contemporary ethical questions surround 21st 
Century neuroscientific technologies. Among these, neurocognitive inter-
vention technologies allow an unprecedented ability to alter thought. 
Concerns exist about their impact on individual freedom, behavior and 
personhood. They could also distort society, eroding core values of dignity, 
equality, and diversity. Potent laws are needed to anchor regulation in this 
rising field. The article explores how the long-neglected human right of 
Freedom of Thought might protect the integrity of the mind at the legal 
system’s highest level. Sample cases illustrate how it could be given effect 
ethically and legally to set boundaries for neurocognitive intervention.
KEYWORDS 
Neuroethics; neuroscience; 
neurolaw; freedom of 
thought
The ethics of neuroscience is emerging as one of the most compelling, confounding and contentious 
areas of ethical concern in contemporary technology-dominated society. This is hardly surprising, 
given that neuroscience reaches beyond the biology of the brain to understanding and altering human 
behavior and mental experience. Neurotechnological interventions that alter human thought and 
behavior call particularly for careful ethical scrutiny and innovative ideas about how to regulate them. 
Within the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw, there is an ongoing need for policies that can anchor 
regulation of the ethical use of new neurotechnologies. This need distinguishes itself from the converse 
issue of neuroscience-based reform of ethical and legal processes, occurring within inherited frame-
works that (up to a point) can still be relied on.
Perhaps the most invasive neurotechnologies are those that alter cognition, given the mind’s 
association with personhood, its identification as a source of freedom and responsibility, and its 
motivation of behavior. Such technologies are also potentially among the ones with the greatest 
potential to distort social relations, by eroding the value of human dignity and overriding the natural 
assumption of equality among persons. Presently existing technologies that fall in this category range 
from psychopharmacology, to psychosurgery, to brain implants and brain-computer interfaces. 
Neurocognitive interventions such as these constitute a critical area for moral reflection and regulatory 
strategizing. In the meantime, ethical and legal constraints increasingly lag behind fast-accelerating 
technological advances.
In this article, I pursue a preliminary exploration of whether and how existing human rights 
provisions on Freedom of Thought could be used to constrain neurocognitive interventions within 
individually assured and socially acceptable limits. The promised protection of Freedom of Thought 
has long been part of the canon of human rights, reproduced in many national constitutions and in 
international conventions. Historically, however, it has not been given freestanding content. As there 
was then no way of directly intervening in thought, and it could only be interfered with indirectly 
through censorship, legal systems assumed that protecting Freedom of Expression sufficed in practice 
to protect Freedom of Thought. That assumption – and practice – is unsustainable in light of modern 
neurocognitive technologies.
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The article explores three realistic case-studies: medical use of brain implants to treat refractory 
depression; individual resort to pharmaceuticals for non-medical neuroenhancement; and military 
neuroaugmentation of soldiers through a brain-computer interface. Analysis of the cases demonstrates 
how Freedom of Thought could be given effect ethically and legally, and used to draw boundaries of 
permissible and impermissible neurocognitive interventions. Recognizing Freedom of Thought as 
having content of its own also accords with basic principles of legal interpretation, and as a regulatory 
measure would provide legal protection to the integrity of the human mind at the highest level of the 
system: constitutional/human rights.
The paper’s discussion is organized in four parts: Part I provides necessary background on 
neuroscience, neuroethics and neurolaw, in introducing the problem of neurocognitive intervention 
technologies. Part II examines the legal status of Freedom of Thought, including provisions for it, their 
in-practice neglect, and the reasons why that is improper and unsustainable. Part III then considers 
how Freedom of Thought could be put to use to help regulate neurocognitive interventions, including 
how Freedom of Thought might be interpreted by courts, and how human rights claims based on it 
could be ethically and legally analyzed. Part IV tests these preliminary suggestions by investigating the 
three sample cases, which represent differing realistic scenarios of neurocognitive interventions and 
their relationship to thought. These scenarios illustrate how the overarching approach suggested in 
Part III would apply in concrete cases, and help flesh out its details. A brief conclusion winds up the 
discussion.
THE ETHICAL FRONTIER OF LAW & SCIENCE: NEUROTECHNOLOGY
Background: neuroscience, neuroethics, and neurolaw
Neuroscience
In the 21st century’s technology-dominated society, the field of neuroscience and associated technol-
ogies has flagged itself as an important, astounding and controversial domain of new research and 
applications. Its significance is only likely to increase in years to come, given that neuroscience 
transcends anatomical study of the brain to include, for instance, diverse means of apprehending 
and altering human behavior and mental experience.1 Indeed, Martha Farah (2010b) has predicted 
that neuroscience “might well shape history as powerfully as the development of metallurgy in the Iron 
Age, mechanization in the Industrial Revolution, or genetics in the . . . twentieth century” (p. 30).
Neuroscience has been defined as “an interdisciplinary field of study concerned with the anatomy, 
physiology, and biochemistry of the nervous system and its effects on behaviour and mental experi-
ence” (Oxford University Press, 2015a). It spans the brain sciences of neurology, psychiatry and 
psychology; other scientific specialties including radiology and genetics also figure prominently in 
present-day neuroscience. As bioethicist and lawyer Margaret Somerville (2006) encapsulates in her 
book The Ethical Imagination, neuroscience aspires “to solve the puzzle of human consciousness and 
unravel the secrets of an organ described as the most complex in the universe” – the human brain” (p. 
184). Neuroscientific applications are as diverse as the range of human mental activity, and include 
interventions that make it possible to “redesign our minds. Probably no other possibility for redesign-
ing ourselves raises such serious ethical questions” (Id.).
Neuroethics & neurolaw
Indeed, the breadth and depth of possible ramifications of neuroscientific research and practice call for 
careful consideration from ethical and regulatory points of view.
Ethical questions are the terrain of neuroethics, which “lies at the intersection of the empirical brain 
sciences, normative ethics, the philosophy of mind, law, and the social sciences” (Glannon, 2007, p. 4). 
1Neuroscientific study is also broader than the human brain: e.g., it covers the brains of other animals, and human nerve tissues 
outside the brain. However, the scope of this paper is limited to the human brain.
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The field of neuroethics in fact encompasses both the neuroscience of ethics (scientific questions 
concerning the role of genetic and experiential influences on ethical thinking) as well as the converse 
which is the focus here, the ethics of neuroscience (ethical questions concerning neuroscientific 
practices). Neuroethics is among this century’s fast-rising fields (Farah & Wolpe, 2007; Goodenough 
& Tucker, 2011).
As new scientific discoveries are made and new technologies developed with the potential to affect 
individuals and society in important ways, ethical evaluation is essential to formulating legal policies 
that will appropriately manage the impacts. The origins of neurolaw were in medico-legal debates in 
the 1960s, when the invention of heart transplants and ventilators required a new definition of death 
not based on heart-and-lung function but on brain function. Debates today focus on the brain in living 
people (Freeman & Goodenough, 2009). It is only since 2000, law professor Michael Freeman 
(Freeman & Goodenough, 2009) assesses, that there has truly been “the emergence of a neurolaw” 
(pp. 1–3). Compared to other legal fields developed centuries ago, neurolaw remains in its infancy.
Hence, a search is still ongoing for policies that can anchor regulation of this emerging field. This is 
especially so on the side of ethical use of new neurotechnologies, as opposed to the flipside of 
neuroscientific reform of established ethical and legal approaches whose broader structures (for 
example, crime and punishment) might still be significantly relied on (Houston & Vierboom, 2012; 
Meynen, 2014).
The ethical and legal challenge of neurocognitive intervention technologies
Within the spectrum of neuroscientific applications, neurotechnological interventions that alter 
human thought and behavior call particularly for ethical scrutiny and strategic approaches to regula-
tion. These neurotechnologies take various forms, including psychopharmacology, psychosurgery, 
brain implants, and brain-computer interfaces. Interventions can be further subdivided by whether 
they aim at physical conditions, behavior, cognition, or a combination. Arguably the most invasive are 
those that alter cognition, as “one’s thoughts and thought processes are the very core of one’s 
individuality and the root of both freedom and responsibility” as well as motivating behavior (Boire, 
2010, p. 289). Thought-altering technologies are also potentially among those at the highest risk of 
distorting social relations, by eroding the value of human dignity and overriding the natural assump-
tion of equality among persons (Somerville, 2006). This is an area where “science moves faster than 
moral understanding,” and people “struggle to articulate their unease” (Sandel, 2004). Neurocognitive 
interventions hence call both critically and urgently for moral reflection and regulatory strategizing 
over suitable restraints of these fast-advancing technologies.
Episodes in the history of neurocognitive intervention: a cautionary tale
The relatively short modern history of neurocognitive intervention reveals ample reason for caution-
ary regulation of the field. In the mid-20th century, neurologist Egas Moniz was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Medicine for treating impulsive behavior by drilling holes into the side of patients’ skulls, 
pouring in ethanol to destroy brain tissue, and cutting holes out of the forebrain (Tan & Yip, 2014); for 
this, he used a surgical device called a leucotome invented by Canadian physician Kenneth McKenzie 
(Todkill, 1999). For decades thereafter, the similar prefrontal lobotomy promoted by American 
neurologist Walter Freeman gained widespread use: a tool modeled after an ice-pick was inserted 
through the top of the eyelid and hammered into the brain where it was twisted around to cut away 
brain tissue until the patient became incoherent (Caruso & Sheehan, 2017); the elite classes of society 
were among those tempted by this neurocognitive intervention – John F. Kennedy’s sister Rosemary 
was institutionalized for life as a result of this “treatment”.
At McGill University in the 1950s and 1960s, Dr. Ewen Cameron, Chairman of the World 
Psychiatric Association and President of the Canadian and American Psychiatric Associations, devel-
oped a neurocognitive intervention which he said would cure schizophrenia and mild mood disorders 
(Bhambra, 2019). The CIA, which secretly helped fund the work under the codename Project 
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MKULTRA, hoped the intervention would also reverse the effect of communist brainwashing. Patients 
of Cameron, including physician-colleagues and prominent Montrealers, underwent this procedure, 
during which, among other things, they were kept in long-term drug induced comas and given high 
voltage electroshocks to the brain (McCoy, 2006; see also Orlikow v. United States, 1988; Royal Victoria 
Hospital et al v. Morrow, 1974). The procedure proved of no use for either its public purpose or its 
covert purpose, but was found to be an effective form of torture – still in use in US counterintelligence 
interrogation, summarized in the KUBARK manual (McCoy, 2006).
Present and emerging neurocognitive technologies: clear cause for concern
Today, means and ends of neurocognitive intervention have proliferated. Psychopharmacological 
interventions are available to enhance cognitive executive function and improve memory (Farah, 
2010b), or alternatively to erase memory, for example, of traumatic events (Glannon, 2011). 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation is employed to try to relieve depression and hallucinations. 
Cranial electrotherapeutic microcurrents are applied to attempt to counter anxiety and insomnia. 
And brain and neural prostheses are being implanted with the aim of repairing or replacing damaged 
brain tissue (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010). In addition, brain-computer interfaces are being developed that 
will, for example, “enable us to [mentally] download the Oxford English Dictionary” (President’s 
Council on Bioethics, 2003, p. 284). Meanwhile, over recent decades, the world’s industrial robot 
population has grown exponentially (Perkowitz, 2010) – leading “transhumanist” researchers such as 
MIT’s Rodney Brooks to aspire to create robot-human cyborgs whose “mental, emotional and even 
moral capacities . . . far outstrip those of unmodified humans”. In short, new neurocognitive inter-
vention technologies raise “divisive issues going to the heart of some of our most important human 
values” (Somerville, 2006, pp. 161, 6). Their scope and ambition underscore the need for new ethical 
analyses and legal policies to ensure that fundamental values are not damaged or destroyed by reckless 
development and deployment of new neurocognitive technologies. “The question is therefore not 
whether we need policies . . . but rather what kind of policies we need” (Farah, 2010b, p. 38).
THE LEGAL STATUS OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT
Rationales for investigation as a potential legal restraint on neurocognitive intervention
Among actual and potential legal bases for regulating new neurocognitive intervention technologies, 
this article investigates how existing provisions on Freedom of Thought might be used to help keep 
interventions within individually assured and socially acceptable limits. Freedom of Thought has long 
been part of the canon of human rights, protected in many national constitutions and in international 
conventions. However, as will be discussed later, historically it has been neglected in practice due to 
the assumption that there was no way to infringe it, except by censorship, which was dealt with by 
Freedom of Expression. New neurocognitive technologies render obsolete that assumption.
This paper’s investigation of Freedom of Thought’s potential utility in constraining neurocognitive 
interventions within ethically acceptable limits is exploratory, and the conclusions to be drawn from it 
tentative. That said, it is hoped that broad outlines can be sketched of content that could be given to 
existing provisions on Freedom of Thought in order to make them practically available as one notable 
legal tool for regulating neurocognitive interventions. From a technical legal perspective, as will be 
explained in the section on why Freedom of Thought provisions must be given content, principles of 
legal interpretation call for this to be done. Doing so would then result in the integrity of the human 
mind being protected at the highest level of the legal system – constitutional/human rights – and 
without having to campaign for legislative attention let alone try to muster constitutional amendment.
At a more general level, adjudication of constitutional rights claims is a forum for ethical analysis 
and decision-making that complements other fora that have dominated in the field of neuroscience to 
date. Regulatory authorities in the areas of health and safety have tended, for instance, to defer heavily 
to research scientists and physicians on ethical issues of neuroscience (Greely, 2008). The scientific 
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community in turn has tended to be hostile to legal input (Greely, 2008). However, Somerville (2006) 
suggests that an important aspect of ethical decision-making is who is permitted to participate in that 
decision-making. Given that new neuroscientific technologies have perhaps the greatest potential to 
fundamentally alter the nature of persons and of society of any technology in human history, 
opportunities to participate in ethical decision-making in this area should be broad. As advocates, 
lawyers can and do assist people from all walks of life in representing their views.2 Constitutional 
rights cases in particular tend to also incorporate the perspectives of a wide spectrum of interest 
groups, as interveners. In giving consideration to the various arguments to be made for and against 
a neurotechnological intervention, the adjudicative process is balanced in its very structure, and 
founded on the principle “hear both sides” (audi alterem partem). Because contexts like this necessa-
rily involve moral arguments, there is a need for an independent forum (Raz, 1994, p. 335). As 
Dworkin (1985) put it, courts are, through the rule of law, an “independent forum of principle” (p. 32). 
It is true, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, that we cannot assume that judges in themselves are superior 
moral reasoners (Waldron, 2009, pp. 14, 22). Nonetheless, they preside over a system which, as 
mentioned, has several important features that protect the opportunity of various community mem-
bers to have their views taken into account. Judges’ defining skill – supported by these features of the 
institutional design of adjudication, and informed by the diverse viewpoints heard, including scientists 
as expert witnesses – is in deliberating on the merits of arguments, weighing incommensurables, and 
arriving at wise judgments. The scales of balance held by Lady Justice have long-symbolized this 
function. In terms of participation in ethical decision-making, it is true that courts are a less 
conventionally democratic institution than legislatures. However one of the aims of protecting 
fundamental freedoms as human rights is to shelter them from the risk of majoritarian tyranny. 
This certainly includes Freedom of Thought. Indeed, had provisions for it not been neglected at the 
time, they might have prevented the horrific subjection of persons viewed as exhibiting impulsive 
behavior to frontal lobotomies. Human rights also represent a widely-recognized “shared ethics,” 
needed in order to bridge the diverse personal moral viewpoints in contemporary society, in deliber-
ating how to deal with controversies as profound as those raised by the new neurotechnologies 
(Somerville, 2006). And they are a shared ethics that already includes a principle seemingly well- 
suited to the ethical problems of neurocognitive intervention technologies: Freedom of Thought.
Existing provisions on freedom of thought
This section surveys existing provisions on Freedom of Thought under several legal regimes in order 
to show its on-paper potential for use in regulating neurocognitive intervention technologies.
Canada
In Canada, Freedom of Thought has on-paper the strongest possible form of legal protection: 
constitutional entrenchment. It is found within Section 2 of the Fundamental Freedoms listed by 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”): “Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms: [. . .] (b) freedom of thought [emphasis added], belief, opinion and expression” (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, § 2(b)).
Section 1 of the Charter “guarantees” this Freedom “subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” (id. § 1)
Europe
A similar provision exists in Europe under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), 
which applies to all member-states of the EU. Article 9 ECHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of thought [emphasis added], conscience and religion . . . ”.
2Including a wide range of nonprofits that provide legal aid to members of underprivileged groups.
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Article 1 ECHR provides that the member-states “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in . . . the Convention”. Permissible limits on Freedom of Thought are 
defined by art. 9(2) which indicate that it is:
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1950)
United States
In the USA, although not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, Freedom of Thought is 
considered implicit (Boire, 2010) in the Constitution’s First Amendment (US Const amend I., n.d.) As 
the renowned Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo explained:
Freedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With 
rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of this truth can be traced in our history, political and legal. (Palko 
v. State of Connecticut, 1937, p. 327)
Given the “absolutist” scope the First Amendment enjoys under prevailing US constitutional inter-
pretation (Weinrib, 2006, p. 85), Freedom of Thought might be subject to even narrower permissible 
limitation in the US than in Canada or Europe. For example, it is not apparent how the well-known 
“clear and present danger” limit on Free Speech under the First Amendment (Craig v Harney, 1947, 
pp. 371–378) could apply to Freedom of Thought.
International
Freedom of Thought is also protected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”). Article 18(1) of this international treaty, which is legally binding on 173 countries that are 
party to it (ICCPR, 999 U.NT.S. 171, 1966), states that: “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought [emphasis added], conscience and religion. (Id.)
The UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”) has gone so far as to say that art. 18(1) “does not 
permit any limitations whatsoever . . . These freedoms are protected unconditionally . . . This provision 
cannot be derogated from, even in time of public emergency” (United Nations, 2006, p. 195) . In 
reality, the UNHRC Comment is overstated. For example, the full text of art. 18(1) includes the 
“freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, [or] practice” (Id.). However, at the time of this writing, as 
a result of the raging Covid-19 pandemic, numerous jurisdictions have imposed severe restrictions on 
communal religious worship, observance and practice. These have apparently survived legal challenge 
in nations that are party to the ICCPR (Hill, 2020). Thus, in the same context, one can imagine public 
interest regulation making vaccines mandatory or a condition of exercise of civic freedoms such as 
Mobility or Assembly although a vaccine might conceivably cause a few days of severe drowsiness that 
impairs Freedom of Thought. In general, the legal community accepts that freedoms are subject to 
potential limit where multiple core values conflict.
An unfulfilled promise: neglect of freedom of thought in practice
Although provisions for Freedom of Thought have been made in the form of constitutional/human 
rights, historically these provisions have been neglected by the courts. As the late and greatly missed 
law professor Peter Hogg (1998) explained, it was assumed that there was no way of directly 
intervening in thought; it could only be impaired indirectly, through censorship. Thus, following 
the lead of classical philosophers such as John Milton (1644) and John Stuart Mill (1859), judges 
assumed that they protected Freedom of Thought through fierce protection of Freedom of Expression 
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(Moore, 2012). Not perceiving any need to invoke Freedom of Thought itself, judges neglected it, 
failing to give it in practice any content of its own.
The situation in the US may require added explanation. As Freedom of Thought is not mentioned 
by the text of the Constitution, it was the courts that recognized it as inhering in the First Amendment 
(indeed an “indispensable condition” of other freedoms (Palko v. State of Connecticut, 1937, p. 327). 
However, the cases actually concern interference with expression. For instance, West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) recognized “individual freedom of mind” (p. 1185), but at issue 
was an expressive act: compulsory flag salutes. Likewise, Wooley v. Maynard plates (1977) acknowl-
edged “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment” (p. 1435) but the case was 
one of compelled speech on license plates. In United States v. Reidel (1971), where Justice Harlan spoke 
of “the First Amendment right of the individual to be free from government programs of thought 
control” as well as “freedom from governmental manipulation of the content of a man’s mind,” the 
dispute was about a regulation that banned pornographic materials’ dissemination (p. 1414). And in 
Stanley v. Georgia (1969), where Justice Marshall said “our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the 
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds,” the issue was (private) access to 
obscene media (p. 565). In short, the cases have not called for distinguishing protection of thought 
from protection of expression, as neurocognitive intervention technologies proliferating in present- 
day society so obviously do.
Why freedom of thought provisions must be given content
Judges’ omission thus far to give independent content to Freedom of Thought in interpreting the 
provisions for it in constitutions and international covenants is improper from a technical legal 
perspective. A basic precept of legal interpretation is the presumption against tautology, which 
includes the rule that provisions are to be read in such a way as to give intrinsic content to each 
element (Sullivan, 2014, sec. 8.23–8.27.). As Viscount Simons explained, “The rule that a meaning 
should, if possible, be given to every word in the statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the 
contrary, the words add something which would not be there if the words were left out” (Hill 
v. William Hill (Park Lane) Ltd., 1949, at 546). That would include the word “thought” in provisions 
of constitutions and quasi-constitutional international treaties on human rights (Sullivan, 2014, 
§ 8.24).
A similar example was the case Blencoe v. British Columbia (2000), in which the Supreme Court 
of Canada faulted the British Columbia Court of Appeal for having “collapsed the s. 7 [Charter] 
interests of ‘liberty’ and ‘security of the person’ into a single right” (p. 48). They are provided for as 
“distinct interests, and . . . it is incumbent on the Court to give meaning to each of these elements” 
(Id.). One can compare that part of s. 7, which says “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person” to s. 2(b) which, as noted earlier, provides: “2. Everyone has the following 
fundamental freedoms: . . . (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression . . . ” (Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 7, 2(b)). The same conclusions follow for Freedom of Thought as 
provided for in art. 9(1) ECHR, art. 18(1) ICCPR. The argument is a bit more complicated in the 
United States due to the fact that Freedom of Thought is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the 
Constitution, but is considered implicit in the US First Amendment. To be sure, this presents an 
additional challenge. However, the jurisprudence has repeatedly recognized Freedom of Thought in 
distinct language and as a distinct idea from speech (Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 2002; 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965; Olmstead v. United States, 1928; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 
1973; Stanley v. Georgia, 1969; United States v. Reidel, 1971; United States v. Schwimmer, 1929; 
Wooley v. Maynard, 1977). Having gone that far, it makes sense that the courts should go the final 
step of giving to Freedom of Thought content that distinguishes it from speech, and justifies courts’ 
distinct recognition of thought already. While it is unclear how the jurisprudence will develop, it 
does not seem necessary to separate Freedom of Thought from the First Amendment to do this, as 
the First Amendment already contains multiple rights (e.g., religion, assembly) whose content is 
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distinct from what is protected by speech). Thus, under the various human rights regimes where 
Freedom of Thought is recognized but has not been truly relied on in practice, it is incumbent on 
courts to give content to it, as a distinct element from Freedom of Expression. That being so, what 
more clearly demonstrates the distinctness of Freedom of Thought as a concern from concern for 
Freedom of Expression than neurotechnologies that directly intervene in thought, not relying on 
censorship or other expressive pathways?
Although for these reasons it is necessary for courts to give Freedom of Thought provisions their 
own content, a given judge might wonder whether incremental development of the law would be 
served by initially relying on other rights that have already been given content such as Security of the 
Person to protect thought against interference by neurocognitive technologies. However, this would be 
unwise. As the caselaw’s history of relying on Freedom of Expression shows, focusing on other 
interests risks blinding the law to the full range of threats to Freedom of Thought. Moreover, 
a neurocognitive intervention may have diverging impacts on the two rights. Take for example, the 
technology mentioned earlier that erases traumatic memories: arguably, it promotes Personal Security 
by relieving a source of trauma, but impedes Freedom of Thought by also removing from the person’s 
consciousness the enlightening aspect of the impressions taken from the personal experience of the 
event in question. If so, conflating the diverging thought and security interests would avoid the 
essential controversy that calls for ethical and policy consideration in that context. Similar problems 
would be encountered if the judge were to rely for instance, on Autonomy, another fundamental value 
that enjoys broad legal protection. Using the same example of traumatic memory erasure, if the subject 
wishes to avail themselves of the technology, doing so would promote Autonomy, but again could 
have a deleterious impact on the person’s Freedom of Thought that is permanent and irreversible. 
Keeping the two interests separate helps ensure that judges recognize and reflect on contrasting 
impacts such as these, in shaping legal policies that will govern use of a neurotechnology. Further, it 
is especially important that courts not leave Freedom of Thought dependent on “other forms of 
freedom” of which it has itself been recognized by the courts as an “indispensable condition” (Palko 
v. State of Connecticut, 1937, p. 327).
OPERATIONALIZING FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AS A LEGAL RESTRAINT ON 
NEUROCOGNITIVE INTERVENTIONS: PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS
A preliminary legal conception of freedom of thought for use in adjudication
In order to put the existing legal provisions on Freedom of Thought to use in practice in regulating 
neurocognitive interventions, a preliminary conception is needed of what these provisions should be 
interpreted as encompassing.
What is proposed is only a preliminary conception for two reasons. First, approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation vary among jurisdictions. Indeed, within the US alone, different schools espouse 
profoundly different approaches as being proper. As a result, the meaning of Freedom of Thought in 
these provisions will not be dealt with here as a full-blown technical question, strictly applying the 
techniques of legal interpretation. That will have to be done by the courts, jurisdiction by jurisdiction; 
and in each of them, it represents no small task. Nonetheless, the question here is a legal one, not 
a scientific or philosophical one. We are concerned with the meaning courts may ascribe to Freedom 
of Thought, in operationalizing provisions on it for use in adjudicating legal claims that a person’s 
subjection to a particular neurocognitive intervention infringes Freedom of Thought. I will therefore 
focus on factors such as the text and (internal) legislative context of provisions on Freedom of 
Thought, that would be a start point for legal interpretation under any widely-recognized approach 
(Sullivan, 2014, § 1.12).
The second reason the proposed conception is only preliminary is that what is comprised by 
a constitutional right is something that fully emerges gradually and progressively via working con-
ceptions being repeatedly challenged by real disputes and the need to resolve them. The realistic case- 
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studies examined in Part IV will offer an initial chance to test the preliminary conception proposed 
here, and adjust it based on factors that might only emerge in concrete applications.
With that said, what might provisions on Freedom of Thought cover? As the immediate legislative 
context separately mentions freedoms of belief and opinion (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, § 2(b)), thought might be understood to refer to the thinking process. Thinking has been 
defined as “the act or process of having ideas or thoughts” (Oxford University Press, 2015b). Thought 
also suggests a distinction from purely passive mental experience. As the provisions are part of a set of 
protections of individual rights, the freedom element reveals the concern as being with thought that is 
autonomous as opposed to thought which is otherwise directed or controlled. While freedom in the 
ECHR and ICCPR has been interpreted as capable of encompassing a “positive” dimension, in many 
other places including the Canadian Charter and US First Amendment it has been interpreted as 
having a predominantly or wholly “negative” meaning as freedom from interference by others 
(Hirschl, 2000; Joseph, 2015; Mowbray, 2004).3 For our purposes, the negative conception suffices 
to consider what should be covered by Freedom of Thought in any of these jurisdictions, even if 
jurisdictions where it may have a positive dimension might go further. Lastly, the protection should 
apply, as with other rights, against actions which would infringe the freedom either in their purpose or 
their effects (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985). Putting these various elements together, then, 
a preliminary conception of Freedom of Thought might be something along the lines of a right to 
freely engage in ideation of the mind, by the mind, without interference.
By this conception, a real-life example of conduct that would violate Freedom of Thought would be 
the clinic at McGill University overseen by Dr. Cameron, working with the CIA, discussed earlier: The 
purpose of mental (de)programming violates Freedom of Thought (even though it failed). 
Additionally, the forced or deceptive administration of hallucinogenic drugs and high-powered 
electroshocks had cognition-altering effects, again violating Freedom of Thought. Whether a course 
of conduct falls within or outside the scope permitted by Freedom of Thought is not always as clear as 
in that example. Part IV will examine three scenarios that call for closer consideration.
A proposed legal and ethical framework for analyzing freedom of thought claims
The enshrining of Freedom of Thought among the fundamental freedoms found in constitutions and 
international covenants reflects its status as among the core ethical values of a community. As 
surveyed earlier in the section on existing provisions on Freedom of Thought, freedoms may be 
subject to limits where these are justified based on other ethical values embodied, for instance, in 
another protected freedom or overarching community needs that stand in conflict. This subdivision of 
the ethical values at stake is reflected in the analytical framework used by judges to legally evaluate 
a claim based on a fundamental right such as Freedom of Thought. It may be conceptualized as 
involving two steps: (a) asking whether the neurocognitive intervention at issue, in purpose or effect, 
threatens an interest falling within what Freedom of Thought should generally be understood to 
cover?; and if so, (b) asking whether countervailing considerations that should legitimately be 
balanced against the protected interest are sufficient to justify limiting Freedom of Thought in that 
context in order to permit that neurocognitive intervention?
Because both of these steps entail the exercise of judicial discretion, working out the law as guided 
by broad principles, rather than mechanistically identifying and applying bright-line rules, the exercise 
involves an element of legal policy-making. This element is particularly significant where the jur-
isprudence on a given subject is in its infancy, as compared to subjects on which the jurisprudence has 
matured and offers a wealth of similar-case precedents that can guide decisions through more fact- 
based analogical reasoning (Sunstein, 1992).
3Negative freedom is typically understood as noninterference by others, while positive freedom entails state obligations to help fulfill 
rights (see Berlin, 2002).
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As the preceding discussion suggests, the legal policy-making to be done in resolving claims based 
on fundamental rights is principally informed by the ethical values at stake, as opposed to more 
pragmatic considerations such as legal certainty (Fuller, 1969) or the minimization of related future 
litigation (Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 1932). In such cases, “ethics and law are two sides of the 
same coin that often overlap” (Somerville, 2006, p. 34).
Because ethical analysis is central to the resolution of these types of claims, and particularly because 
the jurisprudence on Freedom of Thought is not even at an infancy stage yet – the case-studies that 
follow in Part IV represent an in utero exploration of how that jurisprudence might take shape – it may 
be useful at this stage and for purposes of this paper to make that ethical analysis more explicit than is 
typical in a real-life judgment delivered by a court. Here, this will be done using a modified version of 
the ethical analysis framework suggested by Somerville in The Ethical Imagination (2006). This ethical 
framework appears to fit well with the framework of legal analysis employed by judges (described 
above) in which would be housed the ethical analysis recommended here for the initial case-studies to 
be explored.
This ethical framework, which is principle-based, first considers whether an activity is inherently 
wrong to engage in. This is considered to be the case, for example, of crimes malum in se (such as 
murder, rape, or kidnapping) and not merely malum prohibitum, in criminal law (Dimock, 2016). 
Only if the activity is not inherently wrong does the ethical analysis proceed secondarily to consider its 
consequences. As modified for use in the context here, a neurocognitive intervention will be con-
sidered to be inherently wrong where its very purpose is to violate Freedom of Thought, as courts have 
accepted that where an act’s very purpose is to violate human rights, nothing can justify it (see e.g., Big 
M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985). An example of activity that would be judged inherently wrong (and 
unjustifiable regardless of its consequences) at this first step is the project at McGill under 
Dr. Cameron, working with the CIA, since forcible or deceptive mental (de)programming of people 
was one of its purposes. For activities that are not inherently wrong to engage in, the ethical analysis 
would in a second step weigh the activity’s “risks and benefits” (Somerville, 2006). This fits well with 
the balancing that courts do in assessing whether a limited infringement of an individual right is 
justifiable based on countervailing ethical concerns such as giving effect to another protected freedom 
(e.g., Personal Security in the traumatic memory-erasure example) or overarching community needs. 
Here, the second stage of analysis would be called for if a limited interference with Freedom of 
Thought was among the effects of a neurocognitive intervention pursuing some ethically valuable aim. 
An example would be the vaccine whose side effects include a few days of severe drowsiness which 
impairs Freedom of Thought, mandated as part of a community effort to eradicate a pandemic.
Three case-studies of freedom of thought’s potential utility in regulating neurocognitive 
interventions
The article now looks at how courts might apply Freedom of Thought provisions in hypothetical cases 
meant to embody realistic scenarios involving neurocognitive interventions. Three test cases are 
explored, of disparate categories of neurocognitive technology, used for varying purposes, and in 
different contexts – thus providing a creditable scope and diversity of sample applications. Altogether, 
they illustrate how the overarching approach suggested in Part III would apply in concrete cases, and 
help flesh out its details. In so doing, they also provide an initial opportunity to test and refine the 
model prior to its use in live litigation.
Case 1: neurocognitive treatment for a thought-impairing disorder
Scenario
This first case explores whether a person could, in certain circumstances, invoke Freedom of Thought 
to quash as unconstitutional an administrative decision barring access to a neurocognitive treatment 
for a disease the person has that affects cognition.
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Specifically, the case-study involves a patient suffering from Major Depressive Disorder (“MDD”) 
who seeks access to the neuroscience treatment Deep-Brain Stimulation (“DBS”). The background to 
the Freedom of Thought claim is that regulators in the patient’s jurisdiction have declined to approve 
DBS for use in treating MDD, citing it as too costly.
Facts & background
DBS involves neurosurgical implantation of electrodes that stimulate select areas of the brain (Gordijn 
& Buyx, 2010). Its purpose is to “modulate underactive or overactive neural circuits mediating motor 
functions and mental states associated with conation, cognition, and emotion” (Glannon, 2011, 
p. 175). The patient in this case suffers from refractory MDD: a “mood disorder often accompanied 
by the impairment of cognitive functions” (Mao et al., 2005, p. 9). Clinical studies have shown DBS to 
be beneficial as a treatment for MDD, including in cases where other types of treatments have failed 
(Glannon, 2011; see also Mayberg et al., 2005). The patient is legally capable,4 wishes to access DBS, 
and is willing to pay for it. However, DBS is not approved as a treatment for MDD by the regulatory 
authority, due to its costliness. This case scenario is realistic, as there have been cases presenting 
similar clinical issues. For example, Aden v. Younger (1976) dealt with state restrictions on electro-
convulsive therapy (which, like DBS in this example, was used to treat MDD) and psychosurgery (an 
example being the frontal lobotomy, discussed earlier) for patients competent to consent as in our 
patient’s case, as well as incompetent patients. While the restrictions in Aden were premised on safety 
concerns, the economic rationale for the treatment restriction here is also realistic, as according to 
Walter Glannon (2011), “DBS may be too costly for some healthcare systems . . . The implant costs 
approximately US 50,000 USD and the expensive batteries need to be replaced every two years” (p. 
175). The regulator is concerned that approval of DBS, even for refractory cases of MDD, will lead to 
its frequent use due to the prevalence of MDD within the population and the superior side-effect 
profile of DBS as compared to pharmaceuticals. Insurers have persuaded the regulator that, notwith-
standing the willingness of this patient (and likely others) to pay for the treatment themselves, in the 
end insurers will end up paying for the treatment’s use in the population once available, and that they 
will have to cut corners elsewhere in health insurance coverage, unless everyone is to bear a significant 
increase in health insurance premiums (See e.g., Report of the Standing Committee on Health: Opening 
the Medicine Cabinet – First Report on Health Aspects of Prescription Drugs, 2004; Silversides, 2005). 
Anxious to avoid that outcome, the regulatory authority rejected approval of the treatment.
Given the success of the patient in the Swindon case in Britain in overturning an administrative 
drug approval decision, the patient considered applying for ordinary judicial review of the decision 
barring DBS’ approval for MDD. However, the patient’s lawyer felt that the success in Swindon had 
much to do with the aggressive cancer involved in that case, which posed a high risk to life (On the 
application of Rogers) v. Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust, 2006). The lawyer contemplated a human 
rights claim based on the right to Security of the Person, but ruled that out because unlike in the 
Chaoulli case, the patient here’s claim is not against sweeping legislation that creates system-wide 
threats to rights of Security (and Life) (Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005). The claim has therefore been made 
based on Freedom of Thought as the right which the patient asserts is breached by the ruling of the 
regulatory authority barring approval of DBS for treatment of MDD. The claim asks the Court to 
quash that ruling as unconstitutional, allowing the patient to access DBS treatment.
Court ethical & legal policy analysis
Given the nature of the proceedings as a constitutional rights claim based on Freedom of Thought, the 
interest in that implicated by this fact-scenario is the value that must be the start point of the ethical 
and legal analysis of the case, as discussed in the earlier section on that. The facts of the case are clear 
that MDD impairs cognitive function. DBS would cure that impairment. But the decision by the 
regulatory authority prevents the person from accessing the cure. The regulator’s decision therefore 
4That is, the patient in this case is legally recognized as able to give informed consent to the treatment.
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has the effect of prolonging the impairment of the patient’s cognitive function. Indeed, given that it is 
a refractory case, it could even condemn the person to lifelong cognitive dysfunction. As in Aden, 
“their freedom of thought remains impaired because they cannot get treatment” (p. 546). Thus, 
consistent with the preliminary conception of Freedom of Thought as a human right, proposed 
above for general use in adjudication of rights claims (in the earlier section on that), there is in this 
case an interference with Freedom of Thought.
It is true that the depression arose within the patient’s own bodily processes, while it is the treatment 
that is an external intervention. However, as Glannon explains, “Depression is a manifestation of 
a dysfunctional brain and disordered mind”; a person “doesn’t identify with the state of depression”. 
The treatment allows the mind “to be restored to a functional and ordered state” (2011, p. 196).
As interference with Freedom of Thought was not the purpose of the regulatory decision, but an 
effect of its aim of keeping costs down to manage the financial burden of the healthcare system, the 
decision is not inherently wrong according to the ethical and legal framework set out earlier. And 
hence, per that framework, we must secondarily assess whether the decision’s interference with the 
freedom is justifiable based on other legitimate considerations.
The costliness rationale cited by the regulator is tied to important values of efficient and egalitarian 
resource allocation. The arguments by which the healthcare and health insurance industries influenced 
the regulator also suggest a reasonable interest in protecting vital industries. Because jurisdiction to decide 
on approval of treatments belongs primarily to the regulatory agency, it could be argued on administrative 
policy grounds that deferring to the agency’s decision supports the system in place for public-interest 
decision-making in that context and validates the reasons for that, such as expertise and expediency. On 
the other hand, the possibility of constitutional review is also part of those arrangements, and includes 
review of administrative decisions. Moreover, there was no suggestion by the regulator of concerns about 
the safety, quality, or efficacy of DBS treatment of MDD. Lastly, with respect to the cost concerns, while 
a financial impact will be felt, it is unlikely to bankrupt the healthcare system. In addition, the willingness 
of the patient to pay for the treatment highlights the fact that there are many other health treatments 
approved for use but not covered (or not fully covered) by insurance. From that perspective, it is not so 
much the decision to approve the treatment that determines the financial impact, but other administrative 
decisions taken or not taken with respect to addressing the efficiency and egalitarianism concerns. As one 
example, the authority could tailor treatment subsidies based on ability to pay. In addition, if approval for 
treatment of MDD results in significant increased use of DBS as expected, this could reasonably be 
expected to attract competition in supply that would drive treatment costs down over time.
In consideration of all of the values at stake, it is submitted that the ruling’s interference with 
Freedom of Thought is not justified. The value of Freedom of Thought is underscored by the statement 
of the UNHRC that even public emergencies might not justify its violation. While that statement may 
(as noted) be an exaggeration or oversimplification, it properly signals that the bar must be set high for 
justifying interference with Freedom of Thought. The interference with it in this case is significant and 
not trivial: as discussed, the result of the ruling is to indefinitely prolong or permanently condemn 
a person to a state of dysfunctional and disordered cognition. The noted prevalence of MDD in the 
population does not diminish, but enhances, this concern. The opposing values at stake, while valid 
and relevant, do not outweigh the concern for this violation of Freedom of Thought.
Decision
As the conclusion in this first sample case, it is proposed that the Freedom of Thought claim should 
succeed, quashing as unconstitutional the ruling that barred DBS as a treatment for MDD, for the 
reasons given.
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Case 2: neurocognitive enhancement in a person of healthy mind
Scenario
The second case explored here considers whether Freedom of Thought should be understood to give 
a person of healthy mind a right to use neurotechnology for the purpose of cognitive enhancement.
Specifically, this case-study concerns a fully healthy medical school student who wishes to use the 
prescription medication Ritalin in order to improve academic performance. In this case-scenario, 
regulations in place restrict access to it only to persons suffering from mental disease, disorder, or 
damage.
Facts & background
Methylphenidate, better known by the brand name Ritalin, is among a group of medications “classified 
as stimulant drugs, in that their effect on dopamine and other neurotransmitters have the effect of 
increasing people’s arousal, energy level, and attentional focus” (Farah, 2010a, p. 11).5 For these 
reasons, it is widely prescribed for persons suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(“ADHD”).6 However, illicit use by healthy persons is also prevalent. This case-scenario is realistic in 
that studies have shown that it is “increasingly used to enhance schoolwork by healthy normal college 
students” during study-sessions and exams (Farah, 2010a, p. 11). Beyond students, a survey by Nature 
magazine found that 20% of subscribers had taken Ritalin or other prescription drugs for non-medical 
cognitive performance purposes (Glannon, 2011). Additionally, athletes have used ephedrine and 
other substances for cognitive enhancement purposes in sports performance (Avois et al., 2006; 
Mehlman, 2004). Experts are concerned about even wider non-medical use by healthy older adults 
of prescription drugs intended for elderly patients with mild dementia (Farah, 2010a, p. 12). The drug 
use described in the foregoing examples is known as enhancement.7 The term “enhancement” refers to 
“any intervention designed to improve human . . . functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain or 
restore good health.” By contrast, use that is necessary to sustain or restore health is differentiated by 
the term “therapy” (Glannon, 2011). Supporters of enhancement criticize this distinction, arguing that 
neurocognitive interventions can be seen as operating on a “continuum from treating dysfunction to 
enhancing function”, with the line demarcating dysfunction being of little usefulness (Glannon, 2011, 
p. 115).
The medical student in this case subscribes to this view, and as a consenting adult, feels that 
universal access to Ritalin within safe dosing limits should be lawful. The medical student wanted to 
pursue a claim based on Autonomy, but the student’s legal counsel advised the student that restrictions 
on many prescription drugs have been upheld around the world in spite of individuals’ Autonomy 
interest. Given the medical student’s doubt of the validity of the distinction between cognitive 
enhancement and therapy, legal counsel suggested that maybe Freedom of Thought – finally given 
content recently in being used to quash a prohibition on DBS use by depression sufferers – would be 
fertile ground for the student’s claim.
Court ethical & legal policy analysis
Thought is certainly implicated by the intervention in this case, as “what chemicals can or cannot 
reach a person’s brain synapses directly affects how that person thinks” (Boire, 2010, p. 288). But do 
the regulations restricting access to Ritalin infringe freedom of thought?
5Other common ones include Adderall (amphetamine) and Provigil (modafinil).
6Controversially, some have questioned ADHD’s classification as a disability (see e.g., Diller, 2010, p. 47).
7A separate concern is potential use of neurotechnology for the purpose of human disenhancement: see e.g., Kolber, 2009. Similar 
concerns have arisen in genetics, including use of disenhanced persons to fill undesirable jobs (Somerville, 2006, p. 185).
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Does freedom of thought cover cognitive enhancement?
This case typifies one of the most controversial areas of debate in the ethics of neuroscience, and the 
arguments that have been raised in connection with it necessitate digging deeper into what Freedom of 
Thought means.
Cognitive continuum vs. treatment-enhancement distinction
The student-enhancer challenges the conception of Freedom of Thought preliminarily set out earlier 
in the section on that here, and used in the DBS case, arguing that it is misconceived in being 
predicated on interference with thought. Cognitive restraints are just the inverse of cognitive function, 
the medical student submits, and function is on a continuum. Thus, Freedom of Thought should 
prevent any restriction on enhancing cognitive function.
This view is not supported by the treatment-enhancement distinction. The student acknowledges 
that this distinction is widely relied on in “medical practice and medical insurance contexts, as well as 
in our everyday thinking”, and that it is “largely free from controversy” within the “relatively objective 
and nonevaluative” realms of science and everyday life (Daniels, 2000, p. 315). However, the student 
disputes Norman Daniels’ view that this means that it is an objective reality and not “a social 
construct” (2000, p. 313). As the student rhetorically asks, “who’s to say where sickness ends and 
health begins” (Caplan & McHugh, 2007, p. 277)?
In addition, the student notes that scientific distinctions are not determinative of ethical and legal 
questions. For example, criminal law, for ethical and policy reasons, draws the line of mental disorder 
in a different place than medicine (see e.g., R v Stone, 1999). What, the student asks, would justify the 
law adhering to the treatment-enhancement distinction in deciding the scope of Freedom of Thought?
The nature of personhood & human dignity
8 One answer to that question, given by the President’s Council on Bioethics’s (2003) centers on the 
nature of human dignity and personhood. Legal systems view human rights (including Freedom of 
Thought) as based on human dignity (Moka-Mubelo, 2017). In that regard, the argument for 
enhancement mistakes a proper “intrinsic” understanding of human dignity for an “extrinsic” one 
that disembodies and commodifies intellectual abilities (Somerville, 2006, p. 163). Further, “to be 
human is to be someone, not anyone”; hence, “in seeking by these means to be better than we are . . . 
we risk turning into someone else” (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003, p. 298).This self-alienation 
or loss of sense of personal “authenticity” (Glannon, 2011, p. 141) does not preserve but undermines 
the human dignity that animates human rights.
The medical student questions the significance of altered mental states, arguing that: “if we are not 
the same person on Ritalin as off, neither are we the same person after a glass of wine as before” (Farah, 
2010b, p. 37), or for that matter, “coffee, tea and colas” (Caplan & McHugh, 2007, p. 273). The medical 
student also notes that the alteration is foreseen, arguing that “Jekyll realizes he creates Hyde” 
(Glannon, 2011, p. 142). Citing David DeGrazia (2005), the student suggests that mind alterations 
may even increase authenticity by helping fulfill the individual’s desired self.
However, the argument based on human dignity and the nature of personhood is a forceful one 
against cognitive enhancement being protected by the human right to Freedom of Thought. After all, 
the notion of human rights based on human dignity rests on acceptance of there being some “human 
essence” and on that essence being salient to what the rights protect (Somerville, 2006, p. 168). Human 
rights cannot be understood to protect thought as a disembodied function contained in a pill, or for 
that matter exhibited by a computer. Further, human rights are individual rights. Hence, Freedom of 
8A leading case against enhancement is presented by the President’s Council on Bioethics’s (2003) and Michael Sandel (2004). Their 
approach has been much commented on and a source of confusion. With a view to practical application by a court as envisaged 
here, those arguments are simplified and reorganized for use here: this section distills key arguments against its interpretation as 
included in Freedom of Thought; if it were held to be included, other arguments nonetheless justifying its restriction are 
considered in the next section which considers countervailing interests.
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Thought should be construed as protecting the thought of each “someone,” and not as protecting some 
impersonal cognitive capacity.
It is true that human nature and personhood “also includes disease, aging, death, and inequality,” which 
society can and should intervene against, as the President’s Council recognizes (2003, p. 60). However, that 
is consistent with the preliminary conception of Freedom of Thought suggested for use in adjudication (in 
the earlier section on that) and the decision in the DBS case: as noted in that case, a disorder is not part of 
the human essence, and not something the individual identifies with (Glannon, 2011).
The DBS intervention was also inherently limited by its purpose of relieving MDD. By contrast, to 
protect enhancement would entail the complication that “improvement beyond therapy does not 
know any natural limits” (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010, p. 293). Indeed, the argument for enhancement was 
about rejecting limits. Limitless enhancement necessarily reaches a point of changing the nature of 
a thing. In the present context, to say that enhancement of the mind is protected would therefore be to 
protect the transformation of the individual into an effectively different person and still further the 
alteration of whatever is essentially human about the human mind. This is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the status of the protection as a human right.
Although the student correctly notes that the law allows people to enhance through non- 
prescription drugs such as caffeine (and to alter their mental states in other ways through alcohol), 
it does not follow that there is a human right to do so. In fact, there have been laws that prohibited 
alcohol and caffeine consumption (see e.g., Canada Temperance Act, 1927; The Pure Food and Drug 
Act of 190, n.d. as amended in 1912 following; United States v Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca- 
Cola, 1916); and still today their use is regulated in various ways. Even if that were not so, laws can and 
do validly permit individuals to access some thought-affecting substances and not others. The question 
here is not whether the law could permit people to access Ritalin for non-medical purposes. It could. 
But here it has not: the regulations restricted it to use that is medically prescribed. The question is 
whether that restriction violates the constitutional right to Freedom of Thought. The student’s 
remaining arguments for why it should be seen as doing so are best addressed as a matter of 
distinguishing Freedom of Thought from Autonomy.
Freedom of thought vs autonomy
The suggestion that the altered mental state produced by enhancement is foreseen and consented to by 
the individual is not an argument for Freedom of Thought, but for a freedom to alter thought: that is, 
an argument for Autonomy. Attorney Richard Boire and the Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics 
(“CCLE”) dispute this, contending that the freedom to determine one’s future mental states is 
contained in Freedom of Thought (2010; see generally The Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics., 
n.d.). One is assuredly free to think that one wishes to enhance. But Freedom of Thought can only 
protect the right to determine one’s future mental states via thought. Here, the enhanced mental state 
is not determined through a cognitive process such as study or meditation, but by taking Ritalin. The 
freedom to obtain and ingest a substance (in this case Ritalin) is not thought but action. Use of the 
word “determine” discloses the interest contemplated as actually being the right to self-determination: 
Autonomy. The conception of authenticity of DeGrazia, cited by the student, is also manifestly an 
issue of self-determination, not thought. Here, the student considered but declined to pursue a claim 
based on Autonomy, as restricted access to other drugs had often been upheld as constitutional.
For all the reasons discussed above, it is submitted that Freedom of Thought does not protect access 
to Ritalin for enhancement purposes.
Nonetheless, the discussion will go on to consider (as courts often do) – in the alternative that 
enhancement were protected by Freedom of Thought – whether the regulations restricting its use 
represent a justifiable limit on that right based on important conflicting interests.
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In the event enhancement is covered by freedom of thought, do countervailing interests justify 
its limitation?
Pressure to keep up & the arms race risk: concerns about safety, autonomy (of others), equality 
and diversity
A prominent concern with respect to enhancement is that “once a certain number of people have 
undergone enhancing interventions, others would feel under increasing pressure to do likewise . . . to 
keep up. [Unenhanced] abilities could become almost akin to defects” (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010, pp. 292– 
293). Ethicist Bert Gordijn (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010) notes that this is already occurring, especially 
acutely in competitive fields, to the point that “doubts as to the voluntariness of these decisions are 
warranted” (p. 293). This impairs the autonomy of others, effectively placing them under duress in 
making their own decisions of whether to enhance.
Further, it creates the risk of an arms race in which competition induces progressively greater 
enhancement – beyond the safe dosage limits that even the claimant student had wanted to stay within 
(Foster, 2013; Garasic & Lavazza, 2016; Mehlman, 2004). The regulations could be amended to permit 
non-medical use within safe dosage limits. However, once the drug is available for non-medical use, it 
might be more difficult to ensure that use of an enhancing drug stays within those limits (Sahakian & 
Morein-Zamir, 2011).
Another fundamental concern is that existing inequalities and social injustice in society could be 
exacerbated through unequal access to enhancement (Greely, 2008). As Somerville (2006) notes, 
normalizing enhancement is also disquieting through its devaluing of persons with disabilities, and 
discounting of what they contribute to communities by their personal tribulations and triumphs (pp. 
187–192). As a result, the existing marginalization of persons with disabilities may be worsened, 
depriving society of the enriching diversity of their atypical experiences (Jaeger & Bowman, 2005). 
Indeed, the normativity implicit in enhancement of certain cognitive characteristics risks homogeniz-
ing mental experience at the expense of diversity more generally (Veit, 2018).
The nature and meaning of life in a distorted society
Acceptance and commonplace use of cognitive enhancement would also give rise to important 
concerns about society members’ experience of the nature and meaning of life. For instance, the 
risks discussed in the preceding section create apprehension about “an anti-humanistic, competitive 
environment” (Diller, 2010, p. 54). There is also worry that the implicit message that we need to 
“become more than we are” is inherently damaging to human self-esteem (President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2003, p. 70). This could detract from happiness more generally, and success by external 
measures would not make up for that (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). Further, the meaning 
of human achievement would be diminished by the role of enhancing drugs (Faber et al., 2016). That is 
in fact only part of a broader unease about the impact on humans’ sense of personal agency in life 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). The President’s Council on Bioethics also cites a concern of 
“cheating ourselves of the opportunity to learn character by its necessity, to deal with problems, and 
develop virtues” (2003, p. 60). Among these virtues are humility, in recognizing and accepting our 
limitations, along with appreciation of what Michael Sandel describes as “the gifted nature of life” 
(2004). In short, a societal ethos of enhancement could fundamentally distort the “human experience,” 
engender a “false understanding” of life, and deprive citizens’ lives of multiple dimensions of meaning 
(Farah & Wolpe, 2007, p. 53).
This set of concerns has been criticized on the basis that there are aspects of human nature and life 
such as disease and dysfunction that we do not accept and do try to change, and that cognitive 
enhancement would be a helpful change. However, this essentially reprises the attack on the treat-
ment-enhancement distinction that was rejected at the prior stage of whether Freedom of Thought 
covers cognitive enhancement. In part, it was rejected because the risk of unlimited enhancement is of 
altering human nature and life in ways that are fundamental, not mere “aspects” that it could be 
helpful to change within any continuous meaning of human nature and life.
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All in all, a right to cognitive enhancement would give rise to sweeping concerns ranging from 
safety, the autonomy of others, equality, social justice, and diversity to the nature and meaning of 
human life. Thus, even if (contrary to the conclusion at the prior stage), a court were to consider 
enhancement to be covered by Freedom of Thought, it is submitted that the Court should judge this to 
be outweighed by the countervailing considerations discussed.
Decision
The conclusion in this second test case is that Freedom of Thought does not protect use of Ritalin for 
non-medical cognitive enhancement.
Case 3: neurocognitive augmentation & remote control of an individual’s mind
Scenario
Our third and final case considers whether Freedom of Thought should bar neurocognitive interven-
tions that allow transfer of extensive control over a person’s thoughts to a computer or to other 
persons.
More precisely, this hypothetical case concerns a military policy requiring prospective soldiers to 
undergo brain surgery to create a brain-computer interface (BCI) which will augment their capabilities 
in conflict situations. In this case, the soldiers-to-be consented to the intervention as a precondition of 
appointment to their jobs. However, the staff neurosurgeon tasked with implanting the BCIs refused to 
do so. The surgeon now challenges a labor tribunal’s order to comply, arguing that this violates the 
soldiers’ Freedom of Thought. The court hearing the application has accepted that the surgeon has 
standing to make the claim, as it attacks the constitutionality of the tribunal’s order compelling the 
surgeon to perform the BCI implantation.
Facts and background
BCI neurotechnology allows for integrating the functioning of the human brain and computers. The 
case here involves a version of BCI technology where certain areas of soldiers’ brains will be surgically 
deactivated, and neural prostheses implanted and connected to a BCI. The BCI will allow for extensive 
remote control of the solider by a military computer as well as by superior officers using the computer. 
BCIs have been developed to, among other things, control movement (Huang, 2003) and augment 
senses (Somerville, 2006). But our case concerns a BCI which aims to augment “decision-making, 
upgrade memory and cognitive skills, and even allow one person’s brain to communicate wirelessly 
with another’s” (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010, p. 286). The BCI here allows subliminal control of the soldier’s 
thought-processes by a superior officer at a remote location.
The reason this is called “augmentation” rather than “enhancement” is that the stated objective of 
the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is to create non-human (superhuman) capabil-
ities (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010). Indeed, future goals extend to “mind-merging . . . integrating minds of 
several individuals . . . to achieve super-intelligence” (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010, p. 289), and creating 
cyborgs, as discussed in the earlier section on emerging neurocognitive technologies. While the 
military is an obvious locus for BCI-use, concerns also exist about its use in athletics and the regular 
workforce (Gordijn & Buyx, 2010). Beyond the augmenting effect of this neurotechnology, a key 
feature of it that distinguishes it from the sorts of concerns already addressed in the Ritalin case is the 
transfer here of extensive control over thought (augmented or not) to the computer and/or superior 
officers.
Court ethical & legal policy analysis
In the instant case, it seems clear that the soldiers’ Freedom of Thought is at stake. The BCIs alter their 
thought-processes and subject them to external control by computers and by other people (superior 
officers). Conversely, the soldiers’ consent to this is not covered by Freedom of Thought. As held in the 
Ritalin case, the willingness to submit to a neurocognitive intervention implicates a person’s interest in 
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Autonomy, not Freedom of Thought. The installation of the BCIs is thus prima facie a violation of 
Freedom of Thought.
Based on the scheme of ethical and legal policy analysis outlined previously in the section on that, 
the intervention is not inherently wrong, in that the purpose was not to violate this Freedom, but to 
improve military capabilities. Nonetheless, the intervention has the effect of interfering with Freedom 
of Thought. Hence, following the prescribed scheme of analysis, it must now be considered whether 
this infringement is justifiable on the basis of other legitimate values.
As mentioned, the soldiers have exercised Autonomy in consenting to the installation of the BCIs. 
As this was a precondition of appointment to their jobs, installation of the BCIs also advances their 
economic interests by allowing them to procure employment. On the other hand, because it was 
a mandatory condition of their employment, the value of the soldiers’ consent as promoting their 
interest in Autonomy is reduced. As with enhancement in the Ritalin case, the consent here of each 
aspiring soldier is one obtained under the pressure that, without it, they cannot take up the job, and 
will be denied employment. If they do not submit to installation of the BCI, their job will go to 
someone else who does submit to it.
The military counters that soldiers consent to installation of the BCIs is free, as it is motivated by 
the lesser chance of injury or death the soldiers have in conflict situations after augmentation by the 
BCI. However, it is submitted that the Court should reject that contention; in order for weight to be 
given to that claim, the choice would have to be made independent of its requirement as a condition of 
employment.
Nevertheless, it is significant to the Personal Security interest of the soldier that the purported 
object of the BCI is to augment the soldier’s capabilities in conflict situations, which should diminish 
the soldier’s chances of injury or death. Assuming that it does in fact reduce the likelihood of death or 
injury, the installation of the BCI is valuable in promoting the Personal Security of the soldier.
Relatedly – and the argument relied on most vehemently by the military – national security is 
involved, and the BCI technology augments the military’s capabilities in protecting society, thus 
furthering the Security of all citizens.
Despite the importance of the interests in the personal security of soldiers and national security of 
citizens, it is submitted that they do not justify the invasion of Freedom of Thought effectuated by the 
installation of BCIs to give soldiers superhuman capabilities in conflict situations and remote control 
them by computers and/or commanding officers.
As discussed throughout this paper, Freedom of Thought is one which lies at the core of human 
rights. And the intervention contemplated in this case violates it at a profound level. As Boire 
summarizes, “controlling brain states grants the state the ultimate power over the individual” (2010, 
p. 289). The intervention here is an example of national security measures that go too far according to 
the principle that they must not themselves unduly invade the human freedoms that underlie the 
interest in national security (McLachlin, 2009). In addition, control of human minds by computers or 
other people offends human dignity, which has been recognized as imposing limits on national 
security measures, as evinced by humanitarian war conventions (see e.g., Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949).
Moreover, beyond the violation that is foreseen, there is uncertainty presenting enormous risk in 
technologies such as this, which would disable thought-based human self-control and instill auto-
matistic servitude to machines or other persons (Jonas, 1984). Uncertainties with even greater risks are 
entailed in the technological integration of human and machine into something no longer human – 
cognitively more powerful than its creators (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These uncertainties and 
risks weaken the force of the argument for national security. If enemy militaries use the same 
technology, the superhuman capabilities of the BCI-augmented soldier as a defender of security 
then re-present themselves as a threat to security. The law has imposed limits on measures of national 
security (including biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons) that, in the name of protecting 
individual nations, endanger the entire species (Biological Weapons Convention, 1975; Chemical 
Weapons Convention, 1993; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968). Armed 
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forces comprised of superhuman soldiers controlled in few human hands, or by machines, constitute 
a risk of that kind (Docherty, 2016; Lin, 2013). Arguably, part of that is done by the “friendly fire” of 
a technology that strips soldiers of their humanity by overriding the Freedom of Thought that lies at 
the core of the human essence.
Decision
To conclude this third case, the Freedom of Thought claim by the neurosurgeon should succeed, 
quashing as unconstitutional the order of the labor tribunal to implant the BCI in soldiers’ brains.
CONCLUSION
The preceding case-studies provide initial support for the potential utility of existing but thus far 
neglected legal protections on Freedom of Thought in delimiting bounds of acceptable and unaccep-
table use of neurocognitive intervention technologies. They reinforce and refine a suggested concep-
tion of the meaning and content of Freedom of Thought as protecting people’s opportunity to think 
freely from interference, subject only to reasonable limits called for by the rights of others or 
legitimately overriding needs of society. As the case-studies showed, this conception was able to 
differentiate therapeutic interventions which appropriately allow the mind to think in a healthy way 
free of disease or dysfunction from interventions intended to enhance individual cognitive abilities or 
augment human cognitive capabilities beyond the natural limits that inhere in the status of Freedom of 
Thought as a human rights protection. The case-studies also deepen our understanding of the value of 
Freedom of Thought, hence suggesting that interventions which propose to limit it should face a high 
bar of ethical and legal justification. While these conclusions are presented only tentatively in light of 
the need for further testing in live litigation, they emerge from deliberation on the realistic scenarios 
here as showing promise in guiding the potential application of existing provisions on Freedom of 
Thought to help assure appropriate use of new and developing neurocognitive intervention 
technologies.
The fate of Icarus in Greek mythology symbolizes the danger of heedless use of technology. At the 
ethical frontier is the new neuroscience, whose ambition and powers urgently require justifiable legal 
restraints. Francis Fukuyama has said “it is time to move from recommending to legislating. We need 
institutions with real enforcement powers” (2002, p. 204). However, a cornerstone of the needed 
regulation of neurocognitive technologies may already be in place, albeit neglected in practice. As this 
paper has argued, Freedom of Thought is a long-recognized human right, expressly provided for in 
constitutions and international covenants. Legal principles call for it to be accorded its own content. 
New neurocognitive intervention technologies make the delay in doing so henceforward 
unsustainable.
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